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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)1 requires that employers
pay their employees a specified minimum wage2 and overtime wages
for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.3 The FLSA, in
1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1965 & Supp. 1987) (original version at ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1068 (1938)) [hereinafter FLSA].
2. Section 6(a)(1) of the FLSA mandates that employers pay their hourly employees at a
rate at least equal to the rate specified by the statute. At present, the hourly wage rate is $3.35.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1982). Employers who employ certain categories of employees,
however, are exempt from the minimum wage requirement. FLSA § 13(a), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 213(a) (West 1965 & Supp. 1987).
3. Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA provides that employers who employ hourly workers for
more than forty hours in any workweek pay such employees, for all hours worked in excess of
forty, at a rate "not less than one and one-half times" their hourly wage rate. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 207(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Employers who employ certain specified classes of employees,
however, are exempt from the overtime provision. FLSA § 13(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b) (West
1965 & Supp. 1987).
The FLSA's overtime provisions were designed to decrease unemployment by increasing
the cost of having employees work overtime hours. It was hoped that the overtime penalty
would encourage employers to employ additional employees rather than employ their current
workers for longer hours. Stamas, Long Hours and Premium Pay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May
1979, at 41; see R. EHRENBERG & P. SCHUMANN, LONGER HOURS OR MORE JOBS? (1982)
(analyzing the effect on employment levels of an increase in the rate of overtime pay from time
and one-half to double time); Carr, Overtime Work. An Expanded View, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Nov. 1986, at 36 (1986) (surveying the patterns of overtime work).
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addition, prohibits any person from shipping or selling in interstate
commerce goods produced in violation of these provisions.4 One diffi-
cult question that courts have faced is whether this prohibition should
operate without regard to the manner in which the goods were
acquired. Because of this uncertainty, a conflict developed among the
federal courts over whether Congress intended to extend the prohibi-
tion to a secured creditor who, through foreclosure, owns goods that
were manufactured in violation of the FLSA's minimum wage and
overtime prbvisions.' The Supreme Court of the United States
addressed this conflict in Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock.6
In December 1983, Citicorp Industrial Credit entered into a
"zero balance" financing arrangement with Qualitex Corporation, a
Tennessee textile manufacturer.' Subsequently, the Ely Group be-
came the successor to Qualitex.8 Pursuant to the original agreement
between Citicorp and Qualitex, Citicorp agreed to loan Ely up to $11
million for general working capital, including wages.9 Ely granted
Citicorp a "floating lien" security interest in both its inventory and
accounts receivable,'" and Citicorp perfected its security interest by
4. Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA provides in relevant part:
[lit shall be unlawful for any person . . . to transport, offer for transportation,
ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver or sell with knowledge that
shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the
production of which any employee was employed in violation of [the minimum
wage and overtime provisions] of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1982). Section 3(i) of the FLSA provides that the term "goods" does
not include "goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate con-
sumer ... other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor." 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1982).
5. See infra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
6. 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987); see infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
7. Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 23 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (Ely manufactured
"hosiery, apparel and other textiles and goods through its subsidiaries Rockford Textiles, Inc.,
and Ely & Walker, Inc."), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir.
1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987). In
Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., the Sixth Circuit described the parties' "zero balance" financing
agreement, under which "the creditor transfers funds, on a daily or 'as needed' basis into the
debtor's 'zero balance' bank account to meet the debtor's operating expenses." 788 F.2d 1200,
1201 n.1 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct.
2694 (1987).
8. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2696.
9. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1201 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
10. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987) (No. 86-88).
A lien on inventory is termed a floating lien because it covers collateral that is
"continually being replaced .... Such collateral has been likened to the water flowing through
a stream. [It is] a lien . . . structured to float upon the surface of such a flowing body of
collateral." E. RILEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 8.08(2) (1987); see also Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.- Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien, " 72 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1959) (discussing the
desirability of floating liens under article 9); Weeks, "Floating Liens" in Inventory Financing,
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filing the financing statements required under state law." I The parties'
agreement obligated Ely to provide Citicorp with daily, weekly, and
monthly reports outlining its financial status.1
2
Citicorp monitored Ely's operations through systematic audits
and on-site inspections.' 3 In February 1985, after Ely's financial con-
dition deteriorated markedly, Citicorp ceased providing Ely with
funds.' 4 Ely, despite Citicorp's refusal to provide additional funding,
continued to operate its plants until Citicorp took possession of its
assets through a foreclosure proceeding approximately one week
later. 5
A subsequent investigation by the Wage and Hour Division of
the United States Department of Labor revealed that Ely had not paid
its employees during the three weeks preceding its shut-down, and
thereby had violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the FLSA.'6 As a result, the Department of Labor determined that
the goods produced by Ely's employees during this period were "hot"
because Ely had manufactured the goods in violation of the FLSA. 17
1956 U. ILL. L. F. 557, 557 (Inventory financing is "an essential source of working capital for
small business."). Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) permits security
agreements to cover after-acquired property. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1978). For a discussion of
article 9 of the UCC, see infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
11. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2696. For the provisions of the UCC pertaining to the
establishment and perfection of security interests, see infra notes 111-19. The agreement
between Ely and Citicorp provided that Georgia law governed "the rights and obligations of
the parties." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 4. For the corresponding provisions of
Georgia law governing secured transactions, see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -507 (1982 &
Supp. 1987).
12. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2696.
13. Id. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee noted that
"Citicorp conducted an ongoing monitoring system through auditors and/or field examiners
who verified collateral upon which it made cash advances to Ely Group, Inc .... While these
representatives did not verify wages paid to employees, they did check to see if Ely Group, Inc.
paid all employee taxes." Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 23-24 (W.D. Tenn. 1985),
aff'd sub non. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
14. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2696 (1987).
15. Id. at 2697. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (1978) (describing the rights and
obligations of creditors regarding liquidation of loan collateral upon a debtor's default); infra
notes 111-19 (describing the relevant UCC provisions). Under Georgia law, Citicorp's interest
in the goods was superior to the lien of Ely's employees against the goods for the payment of
their back wages. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 4-5; see GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-310,
44-14-320 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
16. Brief for Respondent Opposing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Citicorp, 107 S.
Ct. 2694 (1987) (No. 86-88). Section I 1 (a) of the FLSA provides that the Administrator of the
Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division is authorized to "enter and inspect [places of
employment subject to the Act], question such employees, and investigate such facts,
conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine
whether any person has violated any provision of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1982).
17. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2697.
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Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA, the "hot goods" provision, prohibits
any person from transporting or selling such goods in interstate
commerce. 18
After discovering that Citicorp intended to sell the goods in
interstate commerce, the United States Department of Labor, pursu-
ant to section 17 of the FLSA,' 9 sought temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions to prevent either Ely or Citicorp from
shipping, selling, or transporting the goods in interstate commerce.2 °
The Department of Labor brought two separate actions in the United
States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Ten-
nessee, because Ely operated plants within both jurisdictions.2
The Department of Labor asserted that Citicorp's planned sale of
the goods would violate section 15(a)(1) of the Act.22 Even though
18. Id. For the relevant text of section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA, see supra note 4. The
Department of Labor guidelines for complying with section 15(a)(1) are set out in 29 C.F.R.
§§ 789.0 - .5 (1987).
The hot goods ban also applies to goods manufactured in violation of section 12(a) of the
Act, which establishes standards for the employment of child labor. 29 U.S.C. § 212(a) (1982).
Unlike section 15(a)(l), which is directed at "any person," section 12(a) applies only to any
"producer, manufacturer or dealer." Id.; see also FLSA § 15(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(4) (It is
unlawful "to violate any of the provisions of section [12].").
19. Section 17 of the FLSA provides in relevant part that "the district courts ... have
jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain violations of [section 15], including . . . the restraint
of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime compensation." 29 U.S.C.
§ 217 (1982).
Section 17 of the FLSA does not expressly provide a private cause of action to enforce
section 15(a)(1). The Supreme Court, however, in Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning
Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946), allowed a private citizen to bring such an action without discussion.
Furthermore, although section 12(b) of the FLSA permits only the Secretary of Labor to bring
an action pursuant to section 17 to restrain violations of the Act's child labor provisions,
section 15 contains no such restriction. See 29 U.S.C. § 212(b) (1982).
20. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2597. The Department of Labor alleged "actual and potential
violations of section 15(a)(l) ... and sought to enjoin [from placement] in interstate commerce
goods that had been produced from February 3 through February 19, 1985." Brief for
Respondent at 8, Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987) (No. 86-88). In addition, the Department of
Labor "sought back pay and liquidated damages from Ely under Sections 16(c) and 17 of the
FLSA." Id. at n.3. Section 16(c) of the FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to "bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages
or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)
(1982). For the relevant text of section 17 of the FLSA, see supra note 19. For a discussion of
the purposes behind section 17, see Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[T]he
purpose of the injunction [under section 17] to restrain the withholding of wages due is not to
collect a debt owed by an employer to his employee but to correct a continuing offense against
the public interest.").
21. See Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'dsub nom. Brock
v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit,
Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987); Donovan v. Rockford Textile Mills, Inc., 608 F. Supp.
215 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir.
1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
22. Brief for Respondent Opposing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 3.
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Citicorp had no liability under the FLSA for the back wages of Ely's
employees, the Department of Labor argued that the goods were
"tainted."23 Payment of the back wages, however, would remove the
taint from the goods and permit Citicorp to introduce the goods into
interstate commerce. In response, Citicorp argued that because Ely,
the employer, was bankrupt and unable to pay back wages to its
employees, the Department of Labor, in reality, was seeking to estab-
lish a secret employees' lien on the goods to coerce Citicorp into pay-
ing the back wages.2 4
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ten-
nessee denied the Department of Labor's application for a temporary
restraining order.25 In contrast, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee issued the temporary restraining
order sought by the Department of Labor in that court.2 6 Both
courts, however, subsequently granted the Department of Labor's
applications for preliminary injunctions.27 Citicorp appealed these
orders to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.28
The Sixth Circuit affirmed both orders, holding that Citicorp was sub-
ject to the section 15(a)(1) prohibition on the sale or transportation of
hot goods in interstate commerce.29 In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit
considered Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co.,3" in which the Second
23. Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial
Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
24. Reply Brief of Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Citicorp, 107 S. Ct.
2694 (1987) (No. 86-88).
25. Donovan v. Rockford Textile Mills, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd
sub nom. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct 2694 (1987).
26. Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 23 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Brock
v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit,
Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
27. See Ford v. Ely Group Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 25-27 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial
Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987); Donovan v. Rexford Textile Mills, Inc., 608 F.
Supp. 215, 217-19 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200
(6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694
(1987).
28. Brock v. Ely Group, 788 F.2d 1200, 1202 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987). Ely ceased operations and, therefore,
did not appeal the district courts' orders. Id. at 1201. Notwithstanding these orders, Citicorp
was permitted to dispose of the goods "on the condition that petitioner place the proceeds in a
separate interest-bearing account to be used to pay the wages of Ely's former employees in the
event that, on appeal, § 15(a)(1) was held to apply to petitioner." Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2697-
98 n.2.
29. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nor. Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
30. 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966).
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Circuit had held that secured creditors were exempt from the prohibi-
tions of section 15(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit, however, after concluding
that the Powell Knitting court misconstrued the purpose of the sec-
tion, rejected the decision as erroneous.3 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, affirmed: Secured creditors who
own hot goods pursuant to a foreclosed security interest are subject to
section 15(a)(1), and therefore are prohibited from selling or trans-
porting those 'goods in interstate commerce. Citicorp Industrial
Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987).
This Note examines the conflict between the rights and interests
of creditors who have a security interest in hot goods and the section
15(a)(1) prohibition on the sale or transportation of such goods in
interstate commerce. Section II describes the judicial interpretation
of section 15(a)(1) prior to Citicorp. Section III discusses the sound-
ness of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Citicorp, and Section IV
analyzes whether the decision can in fact be reconciled with the
FLSA's legislative history. Section V describes the decision's impact
on credit practices and considers the possibility that the decision will
increase the cost of secured lending. Section VI examines the impact
of Citicorp on future litigation of disputes under section 15(a)(1).
Finally, Section VII concludes that the policies underlying Congress'
adoption of the hot goods ban do not support the Supreme Court's
Citicorp ruling.
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. Judicial Interpretation of Section 15(a)(1)
A fundamental issue in Citicorp is whether legislative intent man-
dates the extension of the hot goods ban to goods held by a creditor as
collateral.32 In United States v. Darby,33 the Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of the underlying purpose of section 15(a)(1). 34 In
31. For a discussion of the Powell Knitting decision, see infra notes 47-63 and
accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the Citicorp decision, see infra notes 70-100 and accompanying
text.
33. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108. Darby was indicted for violating sections 15(a)(l), 15(a)(2),
and 15(a)(5) of the FLSA. Id. Darby was charged with "employ[ing] workmen at less than
the prescribed minimum wage, or more than the prescribed maximum hours without payment
to them of any wage for overtime." Id. at 11. (citations omitted). Darby was also charged
with violating the FLSA's record keeping requirements. Id. For the relevant text of section
15(a)(l), see supra note 4. Section 15(a)(2) of the FLSA provides that it shall be unlawful to
violate the Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (1982).
Section 15(a)(5) of the FLSA provides in pertinent part that "it shall be unlawful for any
person ... to violate any of the provisions of section 21 l(c) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5)
[Vol. 42:419
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upholding independently both the FLSA's minimum wage and over-
time provisions, as well as the section 15(a)(1) ban on the shipment of
hot goods as within Congress' commerce powers, the Darby Court
described the purpose of section 15(a)(1):
The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to
make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that
interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of compe-
tition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.
35
Moreover, the Court noted that this injurious competition occurred to
the detriment of employers who abided by the FLSA's minimum
(1982). The following is a list of other relevant FLSA provisions: FLSA § 11(c), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 211 (c) (West Supp. 1987) (imposing record keeping requirements upon employers); FLSA
§ 11(d), 29 U.S.C. § 211(d) (1982) (authorizing the Department of Labor to promulgate
regulations restricting or prohibiting homework); FLSA § 16(a), 29 U.S.C. 216(a) (1982)
(providing criminal sanctions for persons who violate section 15); FLSA § 16(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982) (establishing a private right of action for employees against employers to
recover back wages and damages for violation of the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime
provisions); FLSA § 16(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to
commence actions on behalf of employees to recover back wages and and damages from
employers).
35. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Under the commerce clause, Congress is empowered "[lt]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Darby involved a constitutional challenge to Congress' powers under the commerce
clause to regulate the compensation of employees. The Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Stone, dismissed the argument that the regulation of employees' wages and hours
encroached upon powers reserved to the states:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the Constitution." That power can neither be enlarged nor
diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power. Congress, following its
own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the
commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the
state had not sought to regulate their use.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (citations omitted).
In addition, the Court rejected Darby's contention that the tenth amendment restricted
the exercise of Congress' powers under the commerce clause. In dismissing this argument, the
Court stated, "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments." Id. at 123-24
(citations omitted).
The Court also overruled its decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(Congress is incompetent to exclude goods manufactured by child labor from the channels of
interstate commerce), because it "was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in
the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision and that such
vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since be exhausted." Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
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wage and overtime provisions. The FLSA was aimed at preventing
the dislocation of commerce that resulted from the "impairment or
destruction of local businesses by competition made effective through
interstate commerce."36 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress
intended the Act as a tool to deter "a method or kind of competition
in interstate commerce which it [had] in effect condemned as
'unfair.' ""
Darby involved the criminal prosecution of a solvent employer
for refusing to employ and compensate his workers according to the
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions.3 8 The Court's anal-
ysis, therefore, focused upon an employer who had intentionally vio-
lated the Act, notwithstanding the fact that he had been capable of
conforming to its requirements.39
Prior to Citicorp, the Supreme Court had not addressed the cir-
cumstances under which courts were permitted to enjoin third parties
under section 15(a)(1). The courts of appeals, however, had held sec-
tion 15(a)(1) applicable to third parties.40 In Southern Advance Bag &
Paper Co. v. United States,4' for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a paper manufacturer for shipping hot goods in inter-
state commerce.4 2 The manufacturer in that case purchased lumber
36. Id. at 122.
37. Id. Congress declared the purposes of the FLSA in section 2(a) of the Act:
The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and
instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor
conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the
orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982).
38. Darby, 312 U.S. at IlI.
39. In contrast, Citicorp involved an insolvent employer who did not intend to violate the
minimum wage provision. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1968) (third party, who
failed to qualify as a good faith purchaser, adjudged in violation of section 15(a)(1)); Walling v.
Gulf States Paper Corp., 143 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1942) (third party violated section 15(a)(1) by
purchasing goods from producers who had violated the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime
provisions). But see Sun Pub. Co. v. Walling, 140 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (holding that an
injunction against the interstate distribution of newspapers produced in violation of the FLSA
violates the guarantees of the first amendment). Lone Star is discussed infra notes 131-33 and
accompanying text.
41. 133 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1943). In Southern Advance, the third party was prosecuted
under section 16(a) of the FLSA, which provides criminal sanctions for the violation of section
15. Id. at 450.
42. Id. at 451.
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from independent producers in order to make paper products that
were then shipped in interstate commerce.43 The court found that the
manufacturer had purchased the lumber with knowledge that, the
independent producers had violated the minimum wage requirements
of the Act.44
The independent producers in Southern Advance arguably had
an agency relationship with the manufacturer, who played the role of
principal and stood to benefit from its agent's violation of the FLSA.45
The Southern Advance decision therefore established that the nature
of the relationship between the employer who violates the FLSA and
the third party who comes into possession of the employer's hot goods
is an important factor in determining whether to enjoin the third
party under section 15(a)(1). 46
B. The Powell Knitting Decision
Twenty-five years after the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the FLSA in Darby, the Second Circuit became the first
federal appellate court to consider the applicability of section 15(a)(1)
to secured creditors. In Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co. , the court
held that a factor,48 who had foreclosed its perfected lien on an insol-
43. Id. at 450.
44. Id. Similarly, in Walling v. Acosta, 140 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1944), the district court had
entered a judgment against sixty-six persons, including Acosta, who were engaged in the
needlework trade, enjoining them from violating the FLSA. Id. at 893. Subsequently,
employees who worked under the supervision of an individual, alleged to have been employed
by Acosta, received less than the statutorily mandated minimum wage. Id. In response, the
Department of Labor moved that the district court adjudge Acosta in contempt for violating
the judgment and that he be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
Id. In reversing the district court's discharge of the rule to show cause, the First Circuit stated
that Acosta could be held in violation of section 15(a)(1) even if he were not the employer of
the employees who received less than the minimum wage. Id. at 894.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining agency as a fiduciary
relationship between a principal and an agent); id. § 2 (defining master, servant, and
independent contractor); id. § 94 ("An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction can be
inferred from a failure to repudiate it."); id. § 263 ("[A] principal whose . . . agent has
fraudulently acquired property for him, holds it subject to the interests of the defrauded
person.").
46. "[I]n determining whether a permanent injunction should be granted," courts should
consider the actor's "previous conduct and the dependability of his promises for future
compliance." Dunlop v. Davis, 524 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1975). In addition, "the
granting or denial of an injunction under Section 17 of the Act is addressed to the sound
discretion of the district court." Hodgson v. American Can Co., 440 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir.
1971). For the text of section 17 of the FLSA, see supra note 19.
47. 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966).
48. A factor is one who purchases accounts receivable from a business enterprise for
immediate cash. See Moore, Factoring-A Unique and Important Form of Financing and
Service, 14 Bus. LAW. 703, 706-07 (1959). He then performs the various bookkeeping
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vent sweater manufacturer, could not be enjoined under section
15(a)(1) from shipping or selling in interstate commerce the hot goods
it had taken as collateral.49 Like the creditor in Citicorp, the factor in
Powell Knitting had extended large amounts of credit to the employer
and had received a security interest in the employer's present and
future inventory.5"
The Second Circuit noted that courts could enjoin the sale or
shipment of hot goods by a secured creditor under a literal interpreta-
tion of section 15(a)(1)." The court argued, however, that such an
application would conflict with the purpose behind the hot goods ban.
The court stated that "one purpose of making the sale [of hot goods]
illegal was to prevent adverse competitive effects on those who com-
ply with the Act. Here there can be no connection between the
asserted violation and any effects on competition.15 2 Although the
court did not discuss Darby,53 the Second Circuit's description of the
purpose behind the FLSA's prohibition on the sale or transportation
of hot goods in interstate commerce echoed the reasoning of the
Darby Court. 4
Moreover, the court stated that another motive for the hot goods
ban was to ensure that "wage earners would be paid."55 Because the
employer in Powell Knitting was insolvent and had assigned its assets
for the benefit of its creditors, it was unable to pay the back wages of
its employees.5 6 As a result, the court reasoned that having the factor
pay the employees was the only way to accomplish Congress' goal
that employees be paid according to the FLSA.5 7 The Second Circuit,
however, concluded that such an outcome would be untoward
because Congress never considered the question of overriding the pri-
orities of creditors established by state law. 8 In addition, the court
stated that although "those priorities would fall before § 15 if applica-
ble, we are unable to conclude that Congress intended such a result
functions related to the accounts. Id. at 706. The factor therefore must assume any losses that
may result from a customer's refusal or inability to pay. Id.
49. Powell Knitting, 360 F.2d at 732-33.
50. Id. at 732.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 733. For a discussion of Congress' intent in enacting the hot goods ban, see
supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
53. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
54. Powell Knitting, 360 F.2d at 733; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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here." 9 Hence, a creditor who advanced funds to an employer/
debtor long before he defaulted on his payroll should not be forced to
pay the back wages owed to the defunct debtor's employees.6 ° The
court suggested that if section 15(a)(1) were applied, it would be a
"backhanded" attempt to alter the priorities of the secured creditor.6'
The Second Circuit reasoned that the presence of express exclu-
sions under section 15(a)(1) did not foreclose the creation of a judicial
exemption for secured creditors because the "problem of the foreclos-
ing secured creditor had [not] been brought to the attention of the
Congress" when it amended the FLSA to include an express exemp-
tion for good faith purchasers in 1949.62 Finally, the Department of
Labor's apparent failure to apply section 15(a)(1) to secured creditors
in previous cases weakened its argument for such an application in
Powell Knitting.63
The Fourth Circuit subsequently addressed the applicability of
section 15(a)(1) to secured creditors in Schultz v. Factors, Inc.64 In
Factors, the Department of Labor, pursuant to section 15(a)(1),
sought to enjoin a factor who had loaned funds to a furniture manu-
facturer subject to a valid security agreement. During the period cov-
ered by the financing agreement, the manufacturer became insolvent
and consequently defaulted on its payroll. The factor took possession
of the insolvent manufacturer's finished goods through a foreclosure
proceeding.65 The Fourth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's hold-
ing in Powell Knitting and therefore refused to enjoin the factor under
section 15(a)(1). 66 The court, however, narrowed its application of
Powell Knitting by adding a "proviso" that no collusion could exist
between the secured creditor and the insolvent employer.67
59. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress' powers under
the commerce clause, see supra note 35.
60. Powell Knitting, 360 F.2d at 733.
61. Id.
62. Id. For the text of the good faith purchaser exemption, see infra note 73. For a
discussion of the good faith purchaser exemption, see infra notes 127-47 and accompanying
text.
63. 360 F.2d at 733.
64. 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,487 (4th Cir. 1971).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 32,488.
67. Id. In fact, the court adopted the Powell Knitting holding without discussion, stating
that "[t]he admirable clarity of the opinion [of the Second Circuit in Powell Knitting] spares us
the task of delimiting the Act." Id. With regard to the relationship between the secured
creditor and the insolvent employer, the Fourth Circuit stated:
The reservation is that there be no collusion between the manufacturer and
his financier permitting the introduction into the market of goods produced in
violation of the Act. Because [the employer/manufacturer] had suffered
sanctions for violation of section 15(a)(1) and further because [the factor] had for
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In addressing Citicorp's claim that it was not subject to the hot
goods ban, the Sixth Circuit rejected the judicial exception to section
15(a)(1) created by the Second Circuit in Powell Knitting and modi-
fied by the Fourth Circuit in Factors.68 The Supreme Court granted
Citicorp's petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
circuits.
69
III. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock: SECURED
CREDITORS ARE SUBJECT TO THE "HOT GOODS" BAN
In Citicorp, the Supreme Court rejected Powell Knitting's excep-
tion for secured creditors and therefore affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
decision.70 In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Court held
that Citicorp, a secured creditor who had obtained possession of hot
goods through foreclosure, was not exempt from the prohibitions con-
tained in section 15(a)(1). 7 In addition, the Court stated that the two
exceptions that Congress provided in section 15(a)(1) 72-common
carriers who accept hot goods for interstate transit and purchasers
who in good faith buy hot goods without knowledge that they were
produced in violation of the FLSA 73-constituted the only exceptions
its protection from time to time "monitored" the operations of [the employer/
manufacturer], we scrutinize the relationship of the two for any complicity of
[the factor] in the infractions by [the employer/manufacturer].
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the "evidence [did] not justify a finding that
they did collude in withholding compensation" or in "exacting added labor" from the manu-
facturer's employees. Id.
68. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp
Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987). Subsequent to Factors, the district
courts decided cases involving the applicability of section 15(a)(1) to secured creditors.
Compare Brock v. Kentucky Ridge Mining Co., 635 F.2d 444 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (Enjoining
secured creditors under the hot goods ban is consistent with congressional intent.) with Dunlop
v. Sportsmaster, Inc., 77 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,293 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (adopting Powell
Knitting's judicial exemption for secured creditors under section 15(a)(l)). For an example of
a case holding that federal bankruptcy law does not bar enjoinment under section 15(a)(l), see
Donovan v. TMC Industries, Ltd., 20 Bankr. 997 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
69. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986) (granting petition for
certiorari).
70. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2698. Although the FLSA applies only to "persons," the Court
noted that the Act's definition of a "person" includes a corporation. The Court concluded that
Citicorp's status as a corporation therefore made it subject to the prohibitions of section
15(a)(1). Id. at 2698-99. Section 3(a) of the FLSA defines a "person" as "an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any other
organized group of persons." 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
71. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2698.
72. Id. at 2699.
73. Id. With regard to common carriers and good faith purchasers, section 15(a)(l) of the
FLSA provides:
[N]o provision of this chapter shall impose any liability upon any common
carrier . . . and no provision of this chapter shall excuse any common carrier
[Vol. 42:419
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to section 15(a)(1) and were not applicable to Citicorp.74
Although the Court acknowledged that there was "no indication
that Congress actually considered application of the 'hot goods' provi-
sion to secured creditors when it enacted the FLSA, ' ' 75 it dismissed
Citicorp's contention that Powell Knitting's judicially-created exemp-
tion for innocent secured creditors should be upheld because Congress
intended that section 15(a)(1) apply only to culpable parties.76
According to the Court, "That Congress identified only two narrow
categories of 'innocent' persons who were not subject to the 'hot
goods' provision suggests that all other persons, innocent or not, are
subject to section 15(a)( 1).
'77
The Court indicated that granting creditors a "general exemp-
tion" from the operation of section 15(a)(1), "without any duty to
ascertain compliance with the FLSA," would confer upon creditors
greater protection than good faith purchasers "for whom Congress
specifically added an exemption."' 78 Furthermore, the Court stated,
"In the past, the Court has refused '[t]o extend an exemption to other
than those plainly and unmistakably within [the FLSA's] terms and
spirit,' ",79 and that "enlargement" of the Act by implication was fore-
closed "where the FLSA provides exemptions 'in detail and with
particularity.' "o
Citicorp asserted that even if the common carrier and good faith
purchaser exemptions were the sole exceptions to the hot goods ban,
the Court should look beyond the plain language of section 15(a)(1).
Because the sole aim of the FLSA was to improve the employment
terms of workers, enjoinment of secured creditors who were not
responsible for violating the Act's minimum wage and overtime provi-
from its obligation to accept any goods for transportation; and ...any such
transportation, offer, shipment, delivery, or sale of such goods by a purchaser
who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the
producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of
this chapter, and who acquired such goods for value without notice of any such
violation, shall not be deemed unlawful.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the purposes behind the common carrier and
good faith purchaser exemptions, see infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
74. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2699.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis supplied by Court).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2699-2700 (brackets supplied by Court) (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling,
324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
80. Id. at 2700 (quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 332 U.S. 607, 617
(1944)).
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sions would not further this objective.8 Thus, it was neither within
the spirit of the FLSA, nor within the intention of the drafters of the
Act to hold secured creditors subject to section 15(a)(1).1
2
The Court, in finding Citicorp's argument unpersuasive, stated
that the "legislative intent fully supports the result achieved by appli-
cation of the plain language." 3 According to the Court, the two pri-
mary goals of the FLSA were to improve working conditions and
"eliminate the [unfair] competitive advantage enjoyed by goods pro-
duced under substandard conditions."8 Citing its own opinion in
Darby,85 the Court concluded that preventing the shipment of hot
goods in interstate commerce furthered Congress' desire to eliminate
unfair competition.8 6  Consequently, the Court determined that
enjoining Citicorp under section 15(a)(1) from shipping or selling the
hot goods, formerly owned by the Ely Group, would further this
purpose.87
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that its holding did not affect
Citicorp's ownership of the goods, even though it could not ship or
sell them in interstate commerce. The Court insisted that the decision
did not grant Ely's employees a "possessory interest" in the goods88
and that the Department of Labor's motive in seeking to enjoin
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("[A]
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.")). In Holy Trinity, the Court addressed the
validity of applying a federal statute that prohibited the "importation or migration of any alien
or aliens ... under contract or agreement ... to perform labor or service of any kind," to a
contract between a religious society and a pastor. 143 U.S. at 458. The Court stated that
although the contract in question fell within the "letter" of the statute, there was no indication
that Congress intended it to apply to an agreement "for the employment of ministers, rectors
and pastors." Id. at 458-63. The Court concluded that applying the statute in the instant case
would be contrary to Congress' purpose. Id.; see United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 278 U.S.
269, 278 (1929) ("Where the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to
its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be
taken as the final expression of the meaning intended [and] legislative history may not be used
to support a construction that adds to or takes from the significance of the words employed.").
83. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2700.
84. Id.
85. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For a discussion of Darby, see supra notes 32-38 and
accompanying text.
86. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2701.
87. Id. In a terse concurrence, Justice Scalia commented:
While I would affirm the Court of Appeals even if I agreed with [Citicorp]
that "the sole aim of the FLSA was to establish decent wages and hours for
American workers," and that this goal "is not furthered by application of
§ 15(a)(l)" to secured creditors, I do not disagree with the Court's conclusions
[regarding the purposes of the FLSA], and therefore join its opinion in full.
Id. at 2702 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2701.
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Citicorp from shipping or selling the goods in interstate commerce
was not to coerce it into paying the back wages of Ely's employees;
rather, it was to prevent "tainted goods from entering the channels of
interstate commerce."8 9 Merely because the "petitioner can cure the
employer's violation of the FLSA by paying the employees the statu-
torily required wages does not give the employees a 'lien' on the assets
superior to that of a secured creditor."9
The Court, in addition, argued that there was no difference
between the hot goods ban and other regulatory measures that Con-
gress had enacted to prevent the interstate transportation of harmful
goods that fail to conform to "specified standards."'" The Court
stated that "secured creditors take their security interest subject to the
laws of the land."92 In analogizing the hot goods ban to other statu-
tory prohibitions that Congress had enacted to exclude hazardous
goods from interstate commerce, 93 the Court stated:
If,. for example, the goods at issue in this case were fabrics that
failed to meet federal flammability standards and were therefore
banned from interstate commerce under the Flammable Fabrics
Act, surely petitioner could not argue that it had a right to sell the
inventory merely by virtue of its status as a secured creditor. "Hot
goods" are not inherently hazardous, but Congress has determined
that they are contraband nonetheless. We see no reason for a differ-
ent result merely because a different form of contraband is
involved.94
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice White,
argued that the Court's construction of section 15(a)(1) conflicted
with Congress' intent in enacting the FLSA.95 Congress did not con-
sider the applicability of section 15(a)(1) to secured creditors when it
enacted the provision," and "nothing in the language or history of the
[FLSA] suggests that Congress intended that Act to [apply] when an
employer is unable to pay his employees for the final days of work
that produced the inventory at hand when the plant was forced to
close." 97 Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's deci-
sion would have a negative impact on the operation of federal bank-
ruptcy law and state law regulating secured lending, noting that these
89. Id.
90. Id. (footnote omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2702.
93. Id. at 2701.
94. Id.; see Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1982).
95. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2702 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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areas "constitute discrete bodies of law."9 Because the purposes of
the FLSA "do not fit nicely into [the] contexts [of federal bankruptcy
law and state law governing secured transactions], Congress never
intended to apply the FLSA to these unique areas of the law." 99 Thus
Justice Stevens concluded that the Supreme Court should have
adopted the Second Circuit's holding in Powell Knittng. "
IV. Citicorp Is INCONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS' INTENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Citicorp is problematic. After
concluding that it was uncertain whether Congress had intended sec-
tion 15(a)(1) to apply to secured creditors, the Court's opinion
focused primarily upon one narrow issue: Whether enjoinment of
Citicorp furthered the purposes of the FLSA? Because one purpose of
the FLSA was to prevent the shipment or sale of hot goods in inter-
state commerce,' 1 the Court concluded that enjoining Citicorp would
achieve this goal.102
Although this syllogism is appealing, the court neglected to ask
this most pertinent question: Why did Congress intend to prohibit
the shipment or sale of hot goods in interstate commerce? Both the
Darby Court's opinion °3 and the FLSA's legislative history indicate
that in 1938, Congress foresaw that some employers would violate the
Act to gain an advantage over competitors who complied with the
Act."° Thus, one objective of the hot goods ban was to remove the
incentive to violate the FLSA as a means of undercutting competitors
in the area of labor costs.
Enjoining Citicorp does not further this purpose. Ely is defunct
and is in no position to benefit from its violations of the FLSA. Also,
Ely did not violate the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
FLSA in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage, but did so as
the result of its insolvency."0 5 Ely is therefore quite unlike the
employer in Darby, who consciously violated the FLSA.' 06 Further-
more, Citicorp did not place itself in Ely's shoes and attempt to act as
98. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority did not discuss the impact of its decision
upon federal bankruptcy law because Ely had not filed for bankruptcy and thus the issue was
not before the Court. Id. at 2701 n.10. A consideration of Citicorp's impact on federal
bankruptcy law is beyond the scope of this Note.
99. Id. at 2702-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2704 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2700.
102. Id. at 2701.
103. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
104. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 122.
105. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2697.
106. Darby, 312 U.S. at 11; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42:419
1987] CITICORP INDUSTRIAL CREDIT, INC. v. BROCK 435
its successor. Hence, there is no danger that Citicorp will reap an
unfair advantage. Consequently, applying section 15(a)(1) to Citicorp
does not advance Congress' goal of suppressing unfair competition. 
0 7
There is, however, justification for applying section 15(a)(1) to
secured creditors when the collusion described by the Fourth Circuit
in Factors is present. "8 If an insolvent employer and a secured credi-
tor collude to deny employees the statutorily mandated benefits pro-
vided by the FLSA, the problem of unfair competition exists. In such
circumstances, both parties may reap an unfair advantage by having
reduced the employer's labor costs. Moreover, when such collusion is
present, the creditor and the employer would appear to have an
agency relationship of the type described by the Fifth Circuit in
Southern Advance. 109 As a result, the creditor would be in the posi-
tion of a principal who stands to benefit from the statutory violations
of his agent.' 0
Applying section 15(a)(1)'s ban to secured creditors when there
is no risk of collusion is more troubling. Although this policy insures
the payment of employees, which is one purpose of the FLSA, it
coerces the secured creditor into paying back wages to employees of
defunct debtors. Such a policy could adversely affect the cost and
availability of credit-a result that Congress never intended. It is
important, therefore, to analyze the impact of the Citicorp decision on
credit practices.
V. THE ADJUSTMENT OF CREDIT PRACTICES AFTER Citicorp
The practice of secured lending is regulated by state law. In par-
ticular, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as enacted
by the states in its several versions, establishes uniform rules and ter-
minology to govern secured transactions."' Under a typical security
agreement," 2 a lender," 3 in return for extending credit to a borrower,
107. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
108. 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,487 (4th Cir. 1971); see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying
text.
109. 133 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1943); see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
111. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507 (1978). Article 9 has been adopted by every state except
Louisiana. It also has been adopted by the District of Columbia and the United States Virgin
Islands. See generally Braucher, Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958) (describing the UCC's origin and highlighting some of its major
provisions). For a detailed treatment of article 9, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 873-1135 (1980).
112. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(1) (1978) (" 'Security Agreement' means an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest.").
113. Id. § 9-105(1)(m) (" 'Secured party' means a lender, seller or other person in whose
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receives an interest' 14 in particular assets of the debtor.' The credi-
tor must then "perfect" his security interest to make it fully effec-
tive. 116 The secured creditor's interest is "secured" because the assets
held as secured collateral, '7 upon the borrower's default, must be
used to satisfy the secured creditor's claims before they can be used to
satisfy the claims of the debtor's other creditors. "8 Security agree-
ments thus mitigate the effects of debtor default for the creditor with a
perfected security interest by placing certain secured assets (such as
inventories) out of the reach of all unsecured creditors, including the
debtor's employees, as well as all creditors who subsequently acquire
a security interest in the same goods."I9  Thus, secured transactions
reduce the risk inherent in lending. As a result, all other things being
equal, creditors will furnish credit that is secured in greater amounts
and at a cheaper price than credit that is not secured. Secured lend-
ing, therefore, promotes the availability of credit over and above the
amount that would exist in its absence. 120
favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel paper have
been sold.").
114. Id. §§ 9-306 to -316.
115. Id. § 9-105(1)(d) (" 'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or other per-
formance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and
includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper.").
116. Id. § 9-302. The UCC provides that a secured party may perfect his security interest
by filing a financing statement with the state, or by taking possession of the collateral. Id.
§§ 9-302 to -305. Article 9 also provides for "certain limited classifications of property, an
automatic perfection upon attachment of the security interest without the taking of any action
by the secured party." D. CAMPBELL & D. LYNN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS HANDBOOK 29
(1985); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 111, at 918-92; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to -
408 (describing the process of filing).
117. Id. § 9-105(c) (" 'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest, and
includes accounts receivable and chattel paper which have been sold.").
118. Id. § 9-306.
119. Id. § 9-312 (governing priority where there are conflicting security interests in the
same collateral). Moreover, for the security interest to be enforceable against the debtor or
third parties, the secured party must "either keep possession of the collateral ... [or obtain] a
security agreement which contains a description of the personal property or fixtures that are to
serve as collateral for the loan." In addition, the secured party must "give value for the loan,
[and] the debtor must have rights in the collateral which secures the loan." Squillante, The
Security Agreement. Part I, 1981 COM. L.J. 99, 100 (footnote omitted) (describing the
requirements of attachment under U.C.C. § 9-203(1)); see B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL 3
(1981) (A secured creditor has "the opportunity to claim those assets for the full and complete
payment of the debt owing to him, even if they are the only assets so that the dedication of the
lien assets to his debt means that other creditors will receive nothing at all."); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 901-17.
120. For a discussion of the workings of article 9, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). There is an ongoing
debate concerning the function and utility of secured credit. See, e.g., Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982) (Secured creditors
monitor management's behavior to the benefit of shareholders.); Schwartz, The Continuing
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The Supreme Court's decision in Citicorp undoubtedly will affect
the price and availability of credit because a secured creditor who is
unable to transport or liquidate his secured collateral faces a signifi-
cant devaluation of his security interest.'' The possibility that courts
would enjoin a secured creditor from liquidating the assets of a bor-
rower in default will likely raise the cost of secured lending as a reflec-
tion of this uncertainty.' In addition, the cost of credit could rise to
reflect the risk that the secured lender would pay the back wages of
the defunct borrower's employees in order to remove the taint from
the collateral. The secured creditor who has an interest in hot goods,
like any rational actor, surely would pay the back wages if they do not
exceed the value of the collateral. Such action is the only way a credi-
tor could salvage a portion of the funds that he provided to the
defunct borrower.'23 At the same time, creditors could reduce the
availability of credit because at higher interest rates, creditors can
earn the same amount of money by providing a diminished supply of
credit, and the money otherwise lent as credit would be placed in
investments that would generate the highest possible return. 12 4
Furthermore, a number of companies could face bankruptcy if
credit became too expensive or too scarce. Other businesses could
Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1587 (1984) (The reasons supporting the issuance of
secured debt are not known.); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities. A Review
of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) (Traditional justifications for the issuance of
secured debt are unsupportable.); White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property
Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984) (Secured credit exists because it is more efficient than
unsecured credit.).
121. This diminution in the value of the security interest would be keyed to the likelihood of
the debtor producing goods subject to the hot goods ban.
122. This increase in price would be reflected in a higher rate of interest charged debtors for
credit.
123. The secured creditor might, however, choose not to pay the back wages if the value of
the collateral is only marginally greater than the value of the employees' wage claims. In such
a case, the transaction costs involved in removing the "taint" from the goods might be greater
than the value of the collateral minus the wage claims. See, e.g., Donovan v. TMC Industries,
Ltd., 20 Bankr. 997, 1006-07 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (describing the steps necessary to remove
"taint" from "hot goods").
124. The increase in the cost of secured lending caused by the Citicorp decision might make
unsecured loans more attractive. The Citicorp decision thus could affect the mix of secured
and unsecured debt instruments. For example, as the differential between the costs of secured
and unsecured lending narrows, some borrowers might choose the costlier unsecured loan in
order to avoid encumbering assets. The demand for unsecured credit would thereby increase.
In response to this demand, creditors would increase their supply of unsecured credit.
Secured creditors might also lower their exposure to the increased riskiness of secured
lending by reducing or eliminating inventory as an item of collateral. Thus, for example,
secured creditors would substitute debtor assets, such as accounts receivable, which are not
subject to the hot goods ban, for inventory. The rate of substitution would depend upon the
relative weights that the creditor attributed to riskiness of the noninventory assets and
inventory exclusive of the risk of enjoinment under section 15(a)(l).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
respond to the higher cost of credit by decreasing their borrowing or
delaying plans for expansion. In either case, employees are likely to
suffer. The issues in Citicorp concern more than stopping the ship-
ment of hot goods by secured creditors. The practice of secured lend-
ing depends upon a creditor's ability to liquidate a defaulted debtor's
assets. Finally, Citicorp gives creditors the incentive to structure
future security agreements in order to qualify for exempt status under
section 15(a)(1)'s good faith purchaser exception.' 25 The Supreme
Court in Citicorp in fact indicated that creditors could protect them-
selves from "unwitting" violations of the FLSA if they met the crite-
ria of the good faith purchaser exemption.'26 Thus, the federal
district courts and the courts of appeals will have to grapple with one
of the questions that the Citicorp Court failed to address: Is it feasible
for a secured creditor to qualify as a good faith purchaser under sec-
tion 15(a)(1)?
VI. FUTURE LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 15(a)(1)
Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA provides that the hot goods ban
will not operate if goods were acquired "by a purchaser ... in good
faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the
goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of this
chapter, and.., for value without notice of any such violation [of the
Act].' 27
The Report of the House Managers of the FLSA stated that good
faith is "what a reasonable, prudent man, acting with due diligence,
would have done in the circumstances."' 28 The House report also
125. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
126. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2699. Under the parties' financing agreement, Ely agreed to act
in accordance with applicable governmental statutes and regulations. Brock v. Ely Group,
Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1206 n. Il (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc.
v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987). The Sixth Circuit concluded that this "representation" did
not constitute the written assurance necessary to qualify Citicorp as a good faith purchaser
under section 15(a)(l). Id.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). For the relevant text of this statute,
see supra note 73. Congress inserted the common carrier exemption into the FLSA in order to
forestall a challenge to the constitutionality of section 15(a)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 2182, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938). But see Walling v. Griffin Cartage Co., 62 F. Supp. 396, 399-400
(E.D. Mich. 1945) (common carrier exemption does not apply where transportation of goods is
an incident to their production).
128. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2241, 2271. The House report also commented:
This provision protects an innocent purchaser from an unwitting violation
and also protects him from having goods which he has purchased in good faith
ordered to be withheld from shipment in commerce by a "hot goods"
injunction .... The requirement that he must have made the purchase in good
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noted, "An affirmative duty is imposed upon [the third party pur-
chaser] to assure himself that the goods in question were produced in
compliance with the act, and he must have secured written assurance
to that effect from the producer of the goods."' 9 Congress decided
that notice under the good faith purchaser exemption must be reason-
able: A purchaser must not be aware of the existence of any viola-
tions of the Act by the employer/debtor, and the absence of
knowledge of any violations must be reasonable under the
circumstances. 130
The Fifth Circuit applied this subjective-objective standard in
Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co.,' which held that a mill owner, whose
independent contractors violated the FLSA's minimum wage and
overtime provisions, violated section 15(a)(1).'32 The Fifth Circuit
rejected the mill owner's attempt to qualify as a good faith purchaser
under section 15(a)(1), stating that Lone Star knew or should have
known that its contractors were violating the FLSA:
The person who had sole responsibility for keeping Lone Star
Steel Company in compliance with the Act also had hearsay evi-
dence that the "hot goods" section was being violated .... "Good
faith" under the Act does not include ignoring the obvious. Lone
Star Steel Company had the contractual right to inspect the
records of the contractors at any time. A good faith effort to com-
ply with the Act would have included checking their records and
any further investigation necessary to ascertain the facts. A person
or a corporation cannot take an "ostrich-like attitude" and still be
in good faith under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 33
The rationale for this subjective-objective standard is that notice
under the FLSA cannot be exclusively dependent on the subjective
belief of the purchaser, because he would then have the incentive to





131. 405 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1968).
132. Id. at 670. Lone Star involved an action for an injunction. Lone Star operated a steel
mill and various iron ore mines. Lone Star contracted with independent contractors to haul
ore mined at its mines to its processing plant. Id. at 671-73. The court stated that "the
contract between the company and the contractors provided for the contractors' compliance
with the [FLSA] and written certification of compliance." Id. at 670. The court added that
although "such written assurances were given," Lone Star was aware that the Department of
Labor had previously "conducted an investigation of the wages paid to the contractors'
employees and [had] thereafter filed actions alleging Wage and Hour violations by the
contractors." Id.
133. Id.
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consciously avoid obtaining information that would place a reason-
able person on notice.
To minimize the risk of falling victim to the hot goods prohibi-
tion, creditors who plan to take a security interest in a debtor's future
inventory may seek to qualify as good faith purchasers. 3 4 There are
three possible scenarios under which secured creditors could seek
written assurance of compliance with the FLSA with regard to future
inventory. First, prior to establishing his security interest, the secured
creditor could ask the employer/debtor for written assurance that the
subject goods, to be produced at some future time, would be manufac-
tured in compliance with the Act. Second, when he forecloses on col-
lateral held by the employer/debtor, the secured creditor could seek
assurance that the goods subject to the security interest were made in
compliance with the Act. The third scenario would require the
secured creditor to seek continual assurance from the employer/
debtor as each batch of goods is manufactured.
Under either of the first two scenarios, the secured creditor could
not qualify as a good faith purchaser if that term is to have any sub-
stantive meaning. Under the first hypothetical, for example, the cred-
itor would seek assurance that goods produced at some future time
would be manufactured in compliance with the FLSA. Assurance as
to the occurrence of a speculative event-the production of goods at
some future time-is not the good faith assurance contemplated by
the Act.135 The good faith purchaser exception would certainly evis-
cerate the hot goods ban as applied to secured creditors if employers
could assure creditors that goods to be manufactured in the future
would be made in compliance with the Act; the secured creditor could
134. The Court in Citicorp never discussed whether a secured creditor could successfully
qualify as a good faith purchaser under section 15(a)(l). The Court merely noted that Citicorp
did not claim standing as either a common carrier or a good faith purchaser. Citicorp, 107 S.
Ct. at 2699. The Sixth Circuit, however, observed that "although the extension of credit might
qualify as a 'purchase,' " Citicorp was not a good faith purchaser because it had not received
written assurance that the goods were produced in compliance with the FLSA. Brock v. Ely
Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub non. Citicorp Industrial Credit,
Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987); see U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1978) (" 'Purchase' includes
taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.").
135. 29 C.F.R. § 789.3 (1987). The regulation states:
A so-called "general and continuing" assurance or "blanket guarantee" stating,
for instance, that all goods to be shipped to the purchaser during a twelve-month
period following a certain date "will be or were produced" in compliance with
applicable provisions of the Act would not afford the purchaser the statutory
protection with respect to any production of such goods after the assurance is
given.
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only hope that the goods subject to his security interest would be pro-
duced in accordance with the Act. He therefore could not rely upon
such an assurance in good faith.
The second scenario also presents analytical difficulties. Under
this hypothetical, the secured creditor would request written assur-
ance from the employer/debtor at the time of foreclosure. Even
assuming that the employer/debtor would be willing or available to
give such assurance at the time the creditor took possession of the
goods, no reasonable secured creditor could rely in good faith upon
such a guarantee: The fact that the secured creditor himself is fore-
closing on the assets of the employer/debtor should invalidate any
assurances from the employer/debtor that the secured goods were
produced in compliance with the FLSA. Rather, if the employer/
debtor defaulted on his obligation to the secured creditor, it is likely
that he also was unable to pay his employees. As a result, no reason-
able creditor could claim that he had no notice of FLSA violations if
he knew that the employer/debtor had been unable to meet his debts.
In contrast, it is possible for a secured creditor to qualify as a
good faith purchaser under the third scenario. The secured creditor
could seek assurance from the employer/debtor as the goods are pro-
duced. This would necessitate, however, that the creditor closely
monitor the employer/debtor's operations.'36 The Citicorp Court in
fact argued that a secured creditor had a "duty" to insure that the
employer/debtor produced the collateral in conformity with the Act:
The Court noted that under the Citicorp-Ely Group financing agree-
ment, Citicorp was permitted and did in fact monitor Ely's op-
erations. 
1 37
Analyzing a creditor's attempt to qualify for good faith pur-
chaser status under the third scenario shifts the focus of the inquiry
under section 15(a)(1). Because of the complexities involved in deter-
mining whether a secured creditor acted in good faith and received
written assurance as to each batch of goods produced, courts will
have to analyze the reasonableness of the creditor's conduct in moni-
toring the operations of the debtor. The exercise of due care in moni-
toring the employer/debtor's operations would create a presumption
that the creditor acted in good faith by seeking assurance that the
goods were produced in accordance with the FLSA.1
3 8
136. The court in Lone Star imposed a similar requirement. See supra notes 131-33 and
accompanying text. Lone Star, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Lone
Star, the third party producer was aware that the employers (independent contractors) had
previously violated the FLSA. Lone Star, 405 F.2d at 670.
137. Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. at 2696.
138. Given the volume of transactions arising during the course of a financing agreement,
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Logic justifies the focus upon the care exercised by creditors in
monitoring the employer/debtor's activities as a proxy for good faith
assurance. If creditors are not held to a standard of reasonableness,
then any assurance pertaining to compliance with the requirements of
the FLSA is suspect-a creditor's negligence in supervising the
employer/debtor's operations casts doubt as to whether the creditor
used due care in obtaining assurance from the employer/debtor.
Moreover, requiring a secured creditor to monitor the employer/
debtor's business continually is seemingly consistent with Lone Star.
The Lone Star court emphasized that Lone Star, prior to its purchase
of goods, should have monitored the wage practices of its independent
producers.
Nonetheless, a duty to oversee a debtor's business continually
during the life of a loan agreement is qualitatively much more burden-
some than the corresponding burden placed on an ordinary one-time
purchaser under section 15(a)(1). There is no indication that when
Congress amended the FLSA in 1949 to include an exemption for
good faith purchasers under section 15(a)(1), it intended to place a
heavier burden on secured creditors than other third party purchas-
ers.' 39 For that matter, there is no reason to believe that Congress
even considered applying section 15(a)(1) to secured creditors,
because secured transactions in 1949 were far less common than
today-article 9 of the UCC, which spurred the growth of secured
transactions, did not become a reality until the late 1950's.' 4 ° Thus, it
is doubtful that Congress intended to differentiate among third parties
in this regard.
There is, however, another problem associated with this ap-
proach. Assuming that a secured creditor determines that the
employer/debtor is violating the Act, there is nothing that the credi-
tor can do to compel the employer/debtor to comply with the Act,
unless the violations constitute a breach of the parties' loan agree-
ment.' 4 ' The creditor, unlike the ordinary purchaser, cannot condi-
tion his purchase of the goods on the employer/debtor's compliance
with the Act: He previously "purchased" the goods when he pro-
the validity and reliability of the creditor's system for monitoring the debtor's business is the
only realistic method for a court to gauge the reasonableness of the creditor's conduct vis-a-vis
the good faith purchaser exemption.
139. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1453, supra note 128, at 10, 31.
140. Note, "Hot Goods" Liability. Secured Creditors and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 644, 652-53 (1987); see also Braucher, supra note I 1l, at 798 (tracing the
origins of the UCC).
141. See Brief for the National Commercial Finance Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 14-15, Citicorp, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987) (No. 86-88).
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vided the employer/debtor with the loan proceeds, and in return, he
took a security interest in the future inventory of the employer/
debtor. 42
In addition, even assuming that creditors modify security agree-
ments so that an employer/debtor's violation of the FLSA constitutes
a breach of the parties' loan agreement, the creditor is still in a weak
bargaining position vis-a-vis the employer/debtor. The value of a
secured creditor's security interest is dependent upon the value of the
collateral. If the collateral consists of inventory to be produced at a
future date, the value of the creditor's collateral is dependent upon
inventory being produced to replace inventory sold. Thus, preventing
the employer/debtor from producing hot goods works to the detri-
ment of the creditor because it reduces the value of his security inter-
est. Furthermore, it might be economically advantageous for the
employer/debtor to halt production rather than comply with the
requirements of the FLSA. This situation would arise in the event
that the cost of FLSA compliance was greater than the value of the
collateral held pursuant to the creditor's lien.'43
The Citicorp Court did not address the extra burdens inhering in
a secured creditor's attempt to qualify as a good faith purchaser. The
Court did not consider whether compelling a secured creditor to over-
see the operations of an employer/debtor in order to qualify as a good
faith purchaser was consistent with the FLSA's limited goals-i.e.,
preventing unfair competition and insuring that workers receive com-
pensation according to the Act's minimum wage and overtime provi-
sions.'" In addition, the Citicorp Court did not address the potential
liability associated with a creditor's oversight of a debtor's operations.
If a secured creditor exercises too much control over a debtor's busi-
ness, he might be held liable for the acts and obligations of the
debtor. 1
45
The Court also failed to consider whether the extra burden of
monitoring the employer/debtor's operations placed upon secured
142. The creditor could also require as a part of the financing arrangement that he have
access to the wage and hour records that the employer is required to keep pursuant to section
I I(c) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C.A. § 211 (c) (West Supp. 1987). The creditor might also apply
pressure to the employer/debtor by indicating to him that violations of the FLSA will result in
a more stringent attitude on his part in assessing the debtor's adherence to his obligations
under the financing agreement.
143. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
145. The creditor might even be held liable as an employer under the FLSA for the
employer/debtor's violations of the Act. See generally Douglas-Hamilton, When are Creditors
in Control of Debtor Companies?, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 15, 1980, at 61-74 (Lenders who oversee
debtors' affairs may be held liable for the claims of other creditors.).
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creditors, as compared with the obligations placed upon other third
parties seeking good faith purchaser status, is consistent with Con-
gress' intent. 46 In fact, the Court did not even discuss the time
period during which Citicorp could have received good faith assur-
ance that the goods were being produced in compliance with the Act.
The "timing issue" and the additional burdens associated with
monitoring the operations of the employer/debtor under the third
scenario indicate that a secured creditor's ability to take advantage of
the good faith purchaser exception is inherently limited. In essence,
the Court's ruling establishes two different classes of third parties in
relation to their abilities to qualify as good faith purchasers. Because
there is no indication that Congress intended to distinguish among
classes of potential good faith purchasers, the Citicorp Court's holding




In enacting section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA, Congress did not con-
sider its application to secured creditors. In fact, security agreements
were uncommon at the time of the FLSA's adoption in 1938 and sub-
sequent amendment in 1949.148 Despite these factors, the Supreme
Court in Citicorp decided that the legislative intent behind the FLSA
mandated the extension of the hot goods ban to secured creditors.
49
The Supreme Court's decision is thus questionable. The Court's
analysis of Congress' intent amounted to nothing more than a mech-
anistic recitation of the FLSA's purpose and was divorced from the
realities of the situation at hand. The Court focused on Congress'
desire to stop the sale or transportation of hot goods in interstate
commerce without giving full consideration to Congress' underlying
motives. Moreover, the Court failed to address the impact on credit
practices that would result from the application of section 15(a)(1) to
secured creditors.' Furthermore, the Court's decision provides no
guidance to the lower courts on how to deal with a secured creditor's
attempt to qualify as a good faith purchaser.' 5' Finally, the difficul-
ties inhering in a secured creditor's ability to qualify as a good faith
purchaser under section 15(a)(1) demonstrate that the Citicorp deci-
sion is inconsistent with Congress' intent. This Note therefore sug-
146. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
147. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1453, supra note 128, at 10, 31.
148. Note, supra note 140, at 652-53.
149. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of Citicorp, see supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the good faith purchaser exemption, see supra notes 127-47 and
accompanying text.
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gests that the Supreme Court's decision in Citicorp was ill-considered
and that Congress should amend section 15(a)(1) to override the
Supreme Court's decision. The Powell Knitting-Factors rule furthers
the FLSA's goals and would be an appropriate substitute for the Citi-
corp holding.
As the Second Circuit noted in Powell Knitting,152 Congress has
the power to affect the priorities of creditors indirectly as an incident
of its commerce powers.' 53 Thus, Congress could have altered the
priorities of secured creditors when it enacted the FLSA and provided
for the section 15(a)(1) ban.'54 The legislative history of the FLSA,
however, does not indicate that Congress ever considered the effect
152. 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966); see supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
153. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239-42 (1978). Citicorp argued
that enjoining secured creditors under the hot goods ban would undermine the "safeguards for
federalism inherent in the structure of the national government" by overriding the state-
established priorities of secured creditors. Reply Brief of Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 24, at 6 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
It also contended that "generally-worded provisions of a federal statute," such as section
15(a)(1) of the FLSA, should be construed to avoid superseding the policy judgments of the
states "on matters of primarily local concern" when there in no indication that Congress "ever
considered, much less intended such a result." Id. at 6 n.7. Citicorp further stated that failure
to adopt such a construction would nullify those "safeguards." Id.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Congress' amendment of the
FLSA to extend its coverage to state and local government employees was challenged as an
unconstitutional interference with the sovereignty of the states qua states. Id. at 836. The
Court, in a five to four decision, struck down the FLSA amendments and thereby created a
narrow exception to Congress' powers under the commerce clause in areas, such as public
employment, where traditional state and local governmental operations are involved. Id. at
855. The Court stated that "Congress may not exercise [its commerce] power so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made." Id.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985), the
Court again considered the application of the FLSA to the states and their political sub-
divisions. In overruling National League of Cities, the Court, in a five to four decision, held
that state sovereignty would be best protected through the political framework of the federal
system. Id. at 546-5 5. Moreover, no member of the Garcia Court questioned the broad power
of Congress under the commerce clause. See id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Even if a
particular individual's activity has no perceptible effect, it can be reached by Congress ... as
long as that [class of activity] affects interstate commerce.").
Citicorp's reliance upon Garcia is therefore misplaced. Regulation of secured transactions
is not a traditional governmental function of the type heid immune from the reach of the
commerce power in National League of Cities. Moreover, not even the Garcia dissenters
suggested that Congress' commerce powers could be restricted in an area not involving
traditional governmental activities. See generally Comment, Garcia: The Preservation of
Federalism Values is Best Left to the Political Process Rather than the Courts, 15 CAP. U.L.
REV. 515 (1986) (arguing that state sovereignty is better protected through state participation
in the federal system, rather than through judicial oversight). For the text of the commerce
clause, see supra note 35.
154. See supra notes 35, 59 & 60 and accompanying text.
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section 15(a)(1) would have on secured lenders. Notwithstanding the
likely adverse impact on credit, extension of the section 15(a)(1) ban
to secured creditors will not achieve Congress' goal of eliminating
unfair competition. In Citicorp, the only purpose served by applying
the section 15(a)(1) ban is to coerce Citicorp into paying the back
wages of Ely's employees. Although ensuring the payment of Ely's
employees furthers one of the central purposes of the Act, it is doubt-
ful whether Congress intended the secured creditor to be responsible
for employers' arrearages. Only when there is a collusive relationship
or agency between the employer and the secured creditor does appli-
cation of section 15(a)(1) to the secured creditor effectuate Congress'
intent. The unfair competition problem foreseen by Congress would
arise only in such a case.
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